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TENDER OFFER LITIGATION AND STATE LAW
MARK J. LOEWENSTEINt

The recent spate of hostile takeover battles has focused attention
and criticism on the federal securities laws. Most claims of defeated
offerors and disappointedshareholdershave been based on sections 14(e)
and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The United States
Supreme Court, however, has limited such federal remedies and suggested that plaintiffs bring state-law actionsfor interference with a prospective economic advantage. ProfessorLoewenstein discusses this tort,
which has not been used widely in this context, and reviews the tort's
traditional elements, its formulation in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and its recent treatmentby state courts. He concludes that interference with a prospective economic advantagecould provide an effective
remedy in tender offer litigation, although certain defenses, if broadly
interpreted,may be obstacles to recovery.
In the aftermath of a contested takeover battle, defeated bidders and disappointed shareholders frequently turn to the federal courts to remedy their perceived losses.' Often they base a cause of action on section 14(e) 2 of the Securit Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1974,
University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank his colleague, Professor Howard Klemme, for his
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft, and Ms. Ruth Pelton-Roby, Class of 1985, for her
valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Ozofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (suit by target shareholders against
successful bidder); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (suit by target shareholders against target
management); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (suit by defeated
bidder against target management, rival bidder, and target's investment banker), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), 384 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any soliciation of security holders in opposition to or in
favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Each of the cases cited supra note 1 was brought under § 14(e). A count based on rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), frequently is included in the complaint. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber
Prods., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982),
prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; § 14(e) similarly prohibits
fraud in connection with any tender offer. Although § 14(e) and rule lOb-5 differ in language, purpose, and legislative history, the courts have interpreted them in pari materia. In Dyer v. Eastern
Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971), the court noted that "[a] sensible and coherent interpretation of the provisions of the two statutes mandates implication of a damage remedy
under Section 14(e) corresponding to that available under Section 10(b). There is every reason to
believe that Congress intended the remedies to be similar." Id. at 914. See generally Loewenstein,
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ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),3 a section that was added to the

Exchange Act with the enactment of the Williams Act in 1968. 4 Section 14(e) is
an antifraud provision that relates specifically to tender offers, but does not con-

tain an express private right of action for damages. A United States Supreme7
6
Court opinion, 5 several lower federal court decisions, and. various scholars,

however, have discussed whether a private right of action should be inferred
from section 14(e).
In its 1977 Piperv. Chris-CraftIndustries 8 decision the Supreme Court held

that a defeated tender offeror did not have standing to maintain an implied cause
of action for damages under section 14(e). 9 The Court, however, expressly reserved the question whether the shareholder-offerees of the target corporation

would have standing.' 0 Although the lower federal courts have continued to
recognize implied private rights of action under section 14(e) on behalf of share13
holder-offerees 1' and others,' 2 Chris-Craft and other Supreme Court cases
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEo. L.J. 1311, 1319 (1983)
(questioning this conclusion).
3. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 404 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982)).
4. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982)). The Williams Act originally was titled "An Act Providing for Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership of Securities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." The Act
was passed in response to an increasing number of cash tender offers and the abuses perceived in
those transactions. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2812. The Act added a new § 13(d) to the Exchange Act, requiring
certain disclosures by persons who acquire more than 10% (later amended to 5%) of any registered
equity security, and a new § 14(d), requiring that certain disclosures be made in connection with a
tender offer. In addition, the Act added a new § 13(e) to regulate purchases by an issuer of its own
securities, a new § 14(0 to require certain disclosures of specified changes in the board of directors of
an acquired company, and a new § 14(e) to extend broad antifraud rules to all tender offers,
5. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
6. E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981) (tender offeror
has standing under § 14(e) to seek injunctive relief); Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 267 (2d
Cir. 1975) (tendering shareholders have standing under § 14(e) to seek damages from tender offeror);
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969) (target
has standing under § 14(e) to seek injunctive relief against tender offeror); O'Connor & Assocs. v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (option trader has standing
under § 14(e) to maintain action against "tippees" who purchased call options from plaintiff knowing that tender offer for shares subject to call option was imminent); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co.,
387 F. Supp. 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (nontendering offeree-stockholder has standing under § 14(e)
to assert claims for damages and injunctive relief against tender offeror).
7. E.g., Loewenstein, supra note 2; Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After ChrisCraft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117 (1978); Comment, An Implied Private
Right of Action Under the Williams Act: Tradition vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 316
(1982).
8. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
9. Id. at 42.
10. Id. at 42 n.28.
11. E.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1281 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1982);
Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. E.g., O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (cause of action available to option traders).
13. See Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 29 (1982) (no implied federal
cause of action exists for breaches of § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (implied right
of action denied under Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981) (private action
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suggest a different result. 14
The trend of the Supreme Court opinions clearly has been to limit the scope
of the federal securities laws, particularly when a state cause of action appears to
be available to the plaintiff.1 5 The Chris-Craft Court noted, as had the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 16 that a plaintiff might have a
state-law cause of action for interference with "a prospective commercial advantage." 17 Partly for this reason, the Court denied Chris-Craft an implied federal

cause of action.' 8

Despite this suggestion, there are few reported decisions in which a defeated

bidder or disappointed shareholder has brought suit for interference with a prospective commercial advantage.19 Such actions are not preempted, since section
for contribution from conspirators denied under federal antitrust laws); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981) (private action for injunctive relief denied under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98
(1981) (private action for contribution denied under Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 784 (1981) (private action
for back wages denied under Davis-Bacon Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (private damage action denied under § 206 of Investment Advisors Act of
1940; equitable relief held available under § 215 of Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 567 (1979) (private damage action denied under § 17(a) of Exchange Act); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (private action for declaratory and injunctive relief denied under
§ 1302 of Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968). But see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S.
Ct. 3221, 3232 (1983) (private cause of action recognized for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, but only limited injunctive relief should be granted for unintentional violations of the
statute); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (private action
inferred under Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717
(1979) (private action to enforce Title IX recognized). See generally Frankel, Implied Rights of
Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981) (arguing that courts must allow private claims as compensation
for those who have suffered "substantial individual injuries" and disallow claims without "compensatory value to individuals"); Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal
SecuritiesActs, 62 N.C.L. Rnv. 853 (1984) (emphasis on applying narrow definition of congressional
intent restricts traditional Supreme Court exercise of power to determine availability of remedies or
standing).
14. The Supreme Court has announced that it will recognize an implied private right of action
only when Congress intended it to do so. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979). As an aid in discerning congressional intent, the Court often applies the four-factor test of
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (remedy available if plaintiff is a member of class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, if there is an indication of legislative intent-express or
implied-to create a private remedy, if implication of a private remedy is consistent with legislative
scheme, and if the cause of action is not one traditionally relegated to state law). In only one case,
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), however, has an application of the Cort
factors resulted in the finding of an implied cause of action. The Court's reluctance to infer private
rights of action and the lack of any significant legislative history indicating that Congress intended
private enforcement of § 14(e) make it doubtful that the Court would infer a private remedy. See
Loewenstein, supra note 2, at 1313-30.
15. The availability of a state remedy for breach of fiduciary duty was a factor in the Court's
decision to limit the scope of rule lOb-5 in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977).
16. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the potential for a
state cause of action in an earlier decision in the same litigation. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 360 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
17. Chris-Craft,430 U.S. at 40-41.
18. Id. In this portion of the opinion the Court applied the fourth prong of the test established
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)-whether "the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to
state law." Id. at 78.
19. Damages were sought on an interference with prospective economic advantage theory in
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Jurisdiction over this claim was based on pendant jurisdiction. Injunctive relief was sought in A & K R.R.
Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearl-
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28 of the Exchange Act states that the Act's remedies supplement all other remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 20 Moreover, a state remedy would not
conflict with federal regulation of tender offers;21 indeed, state remedies for securities fraud long have coexisted with federal remedies, often with a lower standard of proof for the plaintiff. 22 Thus, plaintiffs apparently use the state remedy
infrequently because they perceive it as somehow inadequate. This Article explores the tort of interference with a prospective commercial advantage-or, as
it is more often called, interference with a prospective economic advantage 23 arising from a contested tender offer and concludes that the tort might provide
relief denied under federal law, but only after significant difficulties are
overcome.
A possible interference tort can arise in several different ways in a takeover
contest. Three common ways are:
1. Plaintiff makes a tender offer that is defeated by a rival bidder, whose success is attributable partially to its violations 4of
2
the federal securities laws. Plaintiff sues the rival bidder.
2. Plaintiff makes a tender offer that is defeated by target management's defensive maneuvers, which do not violate the federal securities laws. Plaintiff sues target management.2 5
3. Plaintiff is a shareholder in a company that is the subject of a
hostile tender offer. Target management, without violating
the federal securities
laws, defeats the bid. Plaintiff sues tar26
get management.
These hypothetical examples do not exhaust either the ways in which a
man, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413
N.E.2d 98 (1980). Courts other than the Chris-Craft Court also have suggested the appropriateness
of a state remedy. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 205 (D. Del. 1983),
aff'd, 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984); Rediker v. Geon Indus., 464 F. Supp. 73, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see
also H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (Ist Cir. 1973) ("Tortious interference
with a 'prospective advantage' or inducement not to enter into a contract are wrongs (that under
common law give rise to an action for damages].").
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1982).
21. It might be argued that the possibility of a punitive damage award in a state tort action, see
infra note 66, runs counter to the regulatory scheme of the Williams Act and that therefore the state
remedy is preempted by federal law. The Williams Act, however, does not provide an express cause
of action for damages, and there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to
preempt state remedies that might reach conduct in the tender offer context. Moreover, a punitive
damage award in a state action would not conflict either with Congress' intent to protect sharehold.
ers confronted with a tender offer or with the regulatory scheme of the Williams Act. Cf. Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not
preempt state statute permitting punitive damages in a common-law tort action for contamination by
plutonium).

22. See L. Loss,

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION

899 (1983).

23. Numerous other labels appear in decisions and the literature. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 129 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) ("interference with contractual rela.
tions"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1965) ("interference with prospective contrac.
tual relation"); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4TH 195-241 (1981) ("interference with prospective contractual
relationships").
24. See, eg., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
25. See, eg., Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F.Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
26. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
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tender offer might be defeated or the possible applications of the interference tort

in this area, but they are representative of many, if not most, post-tender offer

damage suits. 27 The legal issues that arise in these cases are typical of the issues

that arise in many other situations: What type of conduct is actionable? Does
the defendant have a privilege allowing him to act in a particular way? If so, are

there limits on the scope of this privilege? Before addressing these issues, it is
useful to discuss briefly the interference tort.

I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TORT OF INTERFERENCE
WITH A PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

As a preliminary matter, the tort of interference with a prospective eco-

nomic advantage must be distinguished from its first cousin, the tort of interference with contract. 28 The latter presupposes the existence of a contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, whereas the former involves
the plaintiff's mere economic expectancy. Arguably, a tender offer may involve
27. In a number of cases, shareholder claims under § 14(e) against target management have
failed. The claims essentially have alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, which most courts have concluded are not actionable under § 14(e). See Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1983);
Bucher v. Shumway, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); In re Sunshine Mining Co. See. Litig., 496 F.
Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 134.9 (N.D. Tex.
1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
28. These two torts originated several centuries ago. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 23, § 129. The tort of interference with contract finds its modem origins in Lumley v. Gye, 2
Ellis & Blackburn 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). In Lumley the Court of Queen's Bench recognized a cause of action against one who enticed an employee, in this case a famous opera singer, to
breach her contract with plaintiff. Lumley was a watershed case in the development of the tort of
interference with contractual relations and was followed 40 years later by Temperton v. Russell,
[1893] 1 Q.B. 715. Temperion extended the Lumley rule to interference with prospective contractual
relations.
Although the facts in Temperton are somewhat unclear, it appears that defendants, who were
trade unionists, wanted plaintiff, a supplier of building materials, to stop supplying materials to
builders who employed nonunion laborers. To accomplish this end, defendants struck and
threatened to strike against employers who dealt with plaintiff. The Queen's Bench Division upheld
a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on two separate causes of action: one for interference with contract
and the other for conspiracy to induce certain persons not to enter into contracts with plaintiff.
With respect to the second cause of action, the court may have decided only that it was unlawful to
conspire to interfere with prospective economic relations; perhaps absent a conspiracy no cause of
action would have existed. The case, however, has been interpreted more broadly, probably because
of Lord Esher's broad dictum that there is no real difference between forcing someone to break a
contract with plaintiff and forcing someone not to enter into a contract with plaintiff. Id. at 728.
In addition to legitimizing the tort of interference with prospective economic relations, Lord
Esher's Temperton opinion has had a lasting impact on the elements of the cause of action.
Temperton is one of a series of cases in which the English courts discussed whether a defendant's
motive should affect the determination of the lawfulness of his actions. Lord Esher believed it
should; thus, motive was a critical factor in the Temperton cause of action.
In Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881), Lord Brett opined that, although merely persuading
one to breach a contract is not by itself unlawful, it becomes unlawful if the persuader did so either
to injure the plaintiff or to benefit himself. Not all of Lord Brett's colleagues on the bench agreed
with him, and not surprisingly, a similar difference of opinion developed in early American cases.
Compare Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry-Goods Co., 105 F. 163 (8th Cir. 1900) (ill will
cannot transform a legal act into an illegal one) with Doremus v. Hennessy, 62 Ill. App. 391 (1895),
aff'd, 176 Il1. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898) (court focused on defendant's malicious motive).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 63

either or both torts. When the bidder makes an offer 29 (or possibly even

before), 30 it has created for itself a prospective economic advantage. If that ad-

vantage is interfered with unlawfully, the common-law tort of interference with
a prospective economic advantage may be invoked. Furthermore, when an offeree tenders securities to the bidder pursuant to the offer, a contract is created
between the bidder and the tendering offeree. 31 If an unlawful interference oc-

curs, causing the tendering security holder to withdraw the securities, the bidder
arguably has an action for tortious interference with contract or contractual relations. Courts generally are much less receptive to certain defenses, such as
competition, when the interference is with a contract as opposed to interference
32
with an expectancy.
Despite the existence of such a contract between the bidder and the tendering security holder, the courts are unlikely to deem interference with a tender

offer to be interference with contract, regardless of when the interference occurs. 33 The "contract" between the bidder and the tendering security holder is
analogous to an "at-will" contract, 34 which the courts generally have treated
more like an expectancy than a contract in this context. 35 Therefore, this Arti29. For the mechanics on how an offer is made, see § 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C,
§ 78n(d) (1982) and Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to 14d-101 (1984).
30. Arguably, the bidder has an expectation of an economic advantage after the target has been
identified, the financing has been arranged, and the feasibility of the takeover has been determined.
But see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
31. In the "typical" tender offer, the bidder offers to purchase the target's securities at a specified price, subject to certain terms and conditions enumerated in its "Offer to Purchase" clause.
Security holders who wish to accept the offer do so by tendering their shares. Although the ultimate
purchase may be, and usually is, subject to certain conditions, a "contract" comes into existence
when the security holders accept the offer. See Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir.
1975).
32. See, e.g., Ulan v. Vend-A-Coin, Inc., 27 Ariz. App. 713, 558 P.2d 741 (1976) (defense of
competition successful; court held that plaintiff did not have enforceable contract right); Heavener,
Ogier Servs. v. R.W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (injunction against
defendant sustained on finding that plaintiff, who alleged interference with existing contracts, was
likely to win on the merits despite fact that defendant was an active competitor); Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637 P.2d 837 (1981) (defendant successfully asserted lack of improper
motive as defense to plaintiff's allegation of tortious interference with an expectancy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of:ToaTS § 766 comment b (1965).
33. Cf. supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (both appellate courts in Chris-Craft implied
that this state-law cause of action might exist).
34. Under an at-will agreement, either party may terminate the contract at any time without
liability. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983) (employer has right to terminate at-will employment contract even if
he acts in bad faith).
35. The law is summarized in W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 995-96.

Mhe

overwhelming majority of the cases have held that interference with. . . contracts
terminable at will is actionable, since until it is terminated the contract is a subsisting
relation, of value to the plaintiff, and presumably to continue in effect. The possibility of
termination does, however, bear upon the issue of the damages sustained, and it must be
taken into account in determining the defendant's privilege to interfere. Thus a contract at
will is usually not protected when the defendant's interference with it is based on any
legitimate business purpose and no improper means is used, as where one employer hires
away employees of another whose contracts are terminable at will.
See Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management, 661 P.2d 296 (Colo. App. 1982)
(protection afforded contract terminable at will is limited and is to be determined on a case-by-case
basis); Heavener, Ogier Servs. v. R.W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App
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cle will focus primarily on the tort of interference with a prospective economic
advantage as it relates to tender offers.
It is no easy matter to state the elements of the tort of interference with a
prospective economic advantage because they differ from jurisdiction to jurisdic37
tion. 36 In addition, the courts still are making judgments on some basic issues.
Two fundamental requirements, however, are that the plaintiff have a reasonable
expectancy of achieving an economic advantage and that the defendant harm the
plaintiff by interfering with this expectancy. A full historical review of the tort is
unnecessary;3 8 its three modem formulations are labeled here as the traditional
41
4°
approach, 39 the Restatement Second approach, and the Oregon approach.
Several issues common to all three approaches will be discussed in the context of
the traditional formulation.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL FORMULATION OF THE TORT OF INTERFERENCE
WITH A PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

The traditional formulation of the tort consists of these elements: (1) intentional interference by the defendant, (2) with an economic expectancy of the
plaintiff, (3) of which the defendant knew or should have known, (4) resulting in
42
the expectancy being lost, (5) and the plaintiff being damaged.
In post-tender offer litigation, the plaintiff easily could satisfy the first three
elements of the traditional approach. First, the rival bidder in the first hypothetical and target management in the second and third hypotheticals take action for
the express purpose of defeating the hostile offer and, thus, commit "intentional
interference." Second, the plaintiff's expectancy-acquiring the target in the
first two hypotheticals and selling shares to the bidder in the third-is evident.
Last, the rival bidder or target management obviously is aware of the plaintiff's
expectancy since that expectancy motivated the interference.
1982) (defendant privileged to compete for contract terminable at will, but plaintiff's expectancy
outweighs defendant's "purely malicious motive").
36. Compare Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. 2d 157, 396 P.2d 148 (1964) (defendant bears
burden of proof on justification) with Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 648, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 732 (1983) (plaintiff bears burden of proof); compare Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955) (interference must be intentional) with J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (recovery allowable for negligent interference); compare A & K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (manner of interference must be independently unlawful) with Lowell v. Mother's Cake &
Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1978) (action for interference with prospective
economic advantage may lie even if the means used by defendant were entirely lawful).
37. In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court modified the elements necessary to state an interference cause of action. Similarly, the Oregon
Supreme Court recently reconsidered the elements of tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage in Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365
(1978).
38. For a brief historical review, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 979-82 and
authorities cited therein.
39. See infra notes 42-127 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
42. See Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious Interference, 23 DRAKE L.
REV. 341, 343 (1974) (setting forth a similar formulation of the elements of the tort).
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The last two elements, however, are not as easy to establish: the plaintiff
must prove that the offer would have succeeded absent the interference-that
the interference caused the lost expectancy-and must establish damages. Furthermore, other issues central to the interference tort generally must be resolved:
Is proof of malice a necessary element of a plaintiff's case? What justifications
or defenses are available to the defendant? Must the manner of interference be
independently wrongful?
A.

Plaintiffs Expectancy and Causation

In each of the hypotheticals, a plaintiff's success arguably will depend on
his ability to prove that the bid would have succeeded. The plaintiff, however,
should not be required to prove with certainty that the offer would have been
successful; rather, he should have to demonstrate only a reasonableprobability
that, but for the defendant's interference, the offer would have been successful
and the plaintiff's expectancy would have been realized. 43 When a defendant's
conduct is particularly objectionable, the plaintiff should be excused from proving even a reasonable probability.44
The reasonable probability standard may be difficult to apply when the interference occurs before the offer is formally made 45 or after the offer is made
but before the minimum number of shares that the bidder is seeking have been
tendered. 46 This standard developed largely from simple cases, such as those in
which the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's negotiations with a third
party, 47 who then can attest to the likelihood of the plaintiff's success. No similar testimony is available in the context of a tender offer.
In ProfessionalInvestors Life Insurance Co. v. Roussel 4 8 the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on an interference claim because plaintiff, who was planning a
hostile offer, did not demonstrate the requisite business relationship with the
target stockholders. Plaintiff had not made its offer and, therefore, did not have
"sufficient expectation of future stock purchases to support a claim of a prospective business advantage." '49 This case suggests that when the plaintiff is a bidder,
it at least must make its offer to satisfy this element of the tort. 50
43. Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 208, 412 A.2d 466,

471 (1979); Cooper v. Steen, 318 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); see also Estes, supra note 42, at
346 (proof of ultimate outcome of claimant's business relationship, in absence of interference, need
only rise to level of "reasonable assurance or probability," not absolute certainty).
44. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 951 (1980); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kan. 1981).
46. See, eg., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
47. E.g., Cooper v. Steen, 318 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
48. 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kan. 1981).
49. Id. at 399.
50. In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981), however, an expectancy was found when Carter Hawley Hale (CHH) approached the
board of Marshall Field &-Co. (Field) in December 1977, proposed a friendly merger, and on Febru-
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Even when the offer is made, however, the plaintiff must satisfy the difficult
burden of demonstrating that the offer would or might have succeeded. In its
1973 decision in Chris-CraftIndustries v. PiperAircraft Corp.5 1 the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit5 2 recognized a private damage action

under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act on behalf of a defeated tender offeror.

Although this aspect of the decision eventually was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 53 the appellate court's views on causation remain instructive.

Chris-Craft complained that the Piper family (target management), Bangor
Punta (a rival bidder), and First Boston Corporation (Piper's investment

banker) all violated section 14(e) of the Exchange Act by making various misrepresentations to the Piper shareholders that caused them to reject ChrisCraft's bid and accept Bangor Punta's offer. The court of appeals determined
that all three defendants violated section 14(e), but agreed with the district
court's findings that Chris-Craft "failed to show with reasonable certainty that it

would have obtained a controlling position in Piper had it not been for the violations of the securities laws . . . . 54 Nevertheless, the court went on to hold in
effect that Chris-Craft did not have to meet a reasonable certainty rest. Rather,
because of the practical difficulties that Chris-Craft would face in proving that

the individual Piper shareholders relied on defendants' misrepresentations,
Chris-Craft only needed to prove constructive reliance-if the misrepresenta-

tions were material and the solicitations that contained the misrepresentations
were a substantial factor in the outcome of the contest, reliance would be pre-

sumed. 55 Because this test was satisfied, the court of appeals simply presumed
that the Piper shareholders would not have accepted the Bangor Punta offer but

for its misrepresentations.
ary 1, 1978, publicly announced CHH's intention to make an exchange offer, subject to certain
conditions, for Field's stock. Following this announcement, Field made a "defensive acquisition"
that would pose antitrust problems for CHH if its offer were successful. On February 22, 1978,
CHH announced the withdrawal of its proposed offer because "'the expansion program announced
by Marshall Field since February 1st has created sufficient doubt about Marshall Field's earning
potential to make the offer no longer in the best interests of Carter Hawley Hale's shareholders.'"
Id. at 281 (quoting CHH press release dated Feb. 22, 1978). The shareholders' suit alleged, among
other things, that the Field directors tortiously interfered with their prospective economic advantage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for defendants on the interference
claim, agreeing that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that defendants' behavior was improper or
that they acted with malice. Id. at 298-99. Neither court, however, based its decision on plaintiffs'
failure to prove causation. It is possible that the courts chose not to cite this reason for the directed
verdict because other more convincing grounds existed. It also is possible to argue, however, that
the plaintiff should be excused from proving causation when the defendant's conduct is particularly
egregious. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
51. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
52. This decision was the second of three decisions that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rendered in this litigation. The other two were Chris-Craft Indus. v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), and Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
53. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977).
54. Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 373.
55. Id. at 373-77. The appellate court employed principles announced by the Supreme Court in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128 (1972). Mills involved nondisclosure in a proxy solicitation and Affiliated Ute involved
nondisclosure in a purchase of securities. In each case, the Court established presumptions of reliance "to avoid an overly difficult burden of proof." Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 374.
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This aspect of the decision, of course, did not involve the interference tort,

but instead involved an interpretation of section 14(e). The court stated that it
was giving an expansive reading to section 14(e) to implement the legislative
purpose of the section-the protection of investors. 56 Because the interference
tort is intended to ensure fair competition, 57 the court's approach could be applied similarly to assist tort plaintiffs in establishing causation. A plaintiff whose

reasonable economic expectancies are interfered with unfairly should not be deprived of relief merely because it is difficult to prove with some degree of certainty that the defendant's conduct precluded realization of the expectancy.
Unless the plaintiff is excused from meeting such a heavy burden, the defendant

would benefit, without risk of liability, from its own wrongdoing. 58 The presumption of causation articulated in Chris-Craft, which arises when the defendant's unlawful conduct is significant in relation to the transaction, is an
appropriate presumption in tortious interference cases.

A similar presumption is used by the courts in labor law. If an employer has
committed unfair labor practices that had "the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes, ' 5 9 a court may circumvent the em-

ployee elections process and order the employer to bargain with the union. The
complaining union in such a case is not required to prove that it would have won
the election; it merely must demonstrate that the employer's conduct tainted the

election process. 6° A bargaining order issued on such a showing both remedies

the damage to the process and deters future misconduct. 6 ' Deterring misconduct, of course, means that a competing interest is sacrificed-here, the employer's and employees' rights to an election are lost. Similarly, if the presence

of egregious interference with a tender offer obviates the necessity of proving
causation, another competing interest is sacrificed-a defendant may be held
accountable for damages even though there is some doubt that its conduct
caused the loss. The deterrent effect, however, justifies this result.
B. Damages

The measurement of damages from tortious interference also has varied
widely; 62 in fact, the difficulty of measuring damages may account, in part, for
56. Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 361.
57. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 956 ("Though trade war may be waged
ruthlessly to the bitter end, there are certain rules of conduct which must be observed.").
58. Few legal principles are established more firmly than that one should not benefit from his
own wrongdoing. See Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331 (Me. 1978).
59. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969); see Comment, Employer Knowledge
of Union Strength as a Basis for Bargaining Orders in the Absence of Unfair Labor Practices or
Elections, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 731.
60. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969).
61. Other rules, such as the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings, also are analogous.
When the exclusionary rule is applied, probative evidence is made unavailable to the fact finder.
Thus, the courts must choose between two competing interests, one of which is deterring
misconduct.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1965) sets forth the measure of damages for
interference with contract and interference with prospective contractual relations without distinguishing between the two. The cases cited infra notes 63-65 similarly do not draw a distinction. See
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the small number of interference cases brought. Some courts, measuring damages in a manner similar to that used in a breach of contract action, have limited
plaintiffs' recoveries to the benefit of their lost bargains. 63 Other courts, emphasizing that tortious interference is an intentional tort, have held that plaintiffs
are entitled to recover all damages resulting from the interference. 64 Still other
courts have limited damages to those proximate to the injury about which complaint is made, as in negligence actions. 65 Punitive damages also have been
66
awarded in appropriate cases.
These various standards can be applied easily in a garden variety interference case. Suppose a real estate broker loses a commission because the defendant interfered with a prospective sale. The amount of the lost commission
generally is a good approximation of damages; 67 punitive damages may be added. When the interference causes a multimillion dollar tender offer to fail,
however, the traditional measures of damages suddenly become inadequate.
Nevertheless, in such difficult cases a reasonable damage formula or other appropriate relief often can be suggested.
If the defeated bidder is left holding a substantial block of the target's stock
at the end of the contest, and the value of that stock has declined because the
shares were purchased at a premium, the defeated bidder may base recovery on
the diminished value of the shares. Essentially, Chris-Craft faced this situation
after its unsuccessful bid for Piper Aircraft. When the dust settled after that
contest, Chris-Craft held 697,495 shares, or approximately forty-two percent of
the outstanding Piper shares. Bangor Punta, the successful bidder, acquired
839,306 shares, or approximately fifty-one percent. Chris-Craft paid an average
of $63.98 per share, which was a substantial premium above the market price.
The economic justification for a premium-that the shares would become "control shares"-was lost when Bangor Punta prevailed.
In Chris-Craft's section 14(e) claim, the court of appeals held that ChrisCraft's block of shares should be revalued on the basis of what it would bring in
a public offering. 6 8 Expert testimony indicated that the earliest time a public
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 1002-04 (discussing various measures of
damages in cases involving interference with contract).
63. E.g., Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, Inc., 121 N.H. 640,433 A.2d 1271 (1981); Leibovitz v.
Central Nat'l Bank, 75 Ohio App. 25, 60 N.E.2d 727 (1944); Island Air, Inc. v. LaBar, 18 Wash.
App. 129, 566 P.2d 972 (1977); see also Estes, supra note 42, at 352-53 ("[T]he courts have applied
differing measures where the action is based upon inducing breach of contract. One line of authorities holds that a contract measure should be used ....
").
64. E.g., Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Inc., 298 Md. 611, 618-22, 471 A.2d 735, 739-40 (1984);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1965).

65. E.g., Cherberg v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977).
66. E.g., Manufacturing Research Corp. v. Greenlee Tool Co., 693 F.2d 1037 (1 1th Cir. 1982);
Nodak Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 533 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1976); Bolz v. Myers, 651 P.2d 606 (Mont.
1982); see also Estes, supra note 42, at 353 ("Punitive or exemplary damages can be recovered in an
action for tortious interference just as in any other intentional tort situation."). In Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984), the court held that awarding
compensatory damages was not prerequisite to awarding punitive damages for an intentional tort.
67. Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 173, 384 A.2d 859 (App. Div. 1978).
68. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 185-90 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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offering could have been held after the contest ended was some three months
later, at which time the public offering price was approximately $27.00 per
share. 69 The court accepted this testimony and fixed damages at $36.98 per
share (the difference between $63.98 and $27.00), a total of $25,793,365 for
70
Chris-Craft's block of 697,495 shares.
Although Chris-Craftinvolved section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and ultimately was reversed when the Supreme Court held that Chris-Craft did not have
standing to maintain a private damage action under section 14(e), 7 1 the appellate court's method of calculating damages could be applied in tort cases. The
court awarded Chris-Craft the damages that resulted proximately from the interference; it avoided any inquiry into what Chris-Craft lost by not gaining control. Such an inquiry would have required "valuing the hypothetical premium
that [Chris-Craft's] holdings would have commanded from a hypothetical buyer
in a hypothetical sale,"'72 a calculation that the court recognized was "'wellnigh an impossible task.' "73
The Chris-Craftcourt was able to avoid that nearly impossible task because
it had a suitable alternative. That alternative disappears when, as a result of an
unlawful interference, the bidder withdraws from the contest without holding
any or holding only a small number of shares of the target. 74 In those instances,
a defeated bidder may argue that its damages are equal to the difference between
the price at which it could have acquired the target and the value to it of owning
the target. Such a measure of damages, however, is so speculative that most
courts probably would reject it.
When the defeated bidder does not seek compensatory damages for a direct
loss to its stock holdings, relief may be unavailable unless the interference enabled another bidder to attain control. 75 In that case, a constructive trust for the
benefit of the injured bidder could be placed on the stock holdings of the successful bidder.76 If the successful bidder itself did not act tortiously vis-a-vis the
69. Id. at 189.
70. Id. at 190.
71. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
72. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
73. Id. at 185 (quoting Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977)),
74. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. But see Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984)
(awarding compensatory damages not prerequisite to awarding punitive damages for intentional
tort).
76. The courts have imposed constructive trusts on property in tortious interference cases. A
typical example is Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wash. 2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050 (1971):
We have here a defendant who has intentionally interfered with another's business relationship and as a result of such interference has acquired the property that was the subject of
that relationship. A constructive trust for the benefit of Scymanski during the period of
improper retention, and a final transfer of the property for the price originally agreed upon,
is the appropriate remedy.
Id. at 88, 491 P.2d at 1057; see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd, 210

U.S. 339 (1908); Estes, supra note 42, at 357.
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plaintiff, but target management did, a constructive trust still might be imposed
aided and abetted or otherwise
-if it can be proved that the successful bidder 77
conduct.
tortious
management's
in
participated
When target security holders are the complaining parties, as in the third
hypothetical, computing damages should be less complicated. A reasonable
measure of damages might be the difference between the tender offer price and
the market value of the securities within a reasonable time after the tortious
interference occurred. This measure would recapture the premium lost by the
plaintiffs. Alternatively, the plaintiffs could allege that the interference unlawfully deterred them from selling their securities in the market, with the measure
average market price during the
of damages being the difference between some
78
tender offer and a post-interference price.

C. Malice
Opinions analyzing the interference tort commonly discuss malice, both
what it is and whether the plaintiff must prove it. Most jurisdictions that have
decided the issue have held that proof of malice is an element of the plaintiff's
case. 79 There are, however, at least three different definitions of malice: acting
with spite or ill will (sometimes called "actual malice");8 0 seeking to harm the
plaintiff;8 and acting without justification or excuse (sometimes called "legal
malice"). 82 These three definitions, though not exhaustive, include nearly all the
83
cases.
In those jurisdictions that require proof of actual malice, a plaintiff faces a
serious obstacle in all three hypotheticals. The party seeking to defeat a tender
offer usually will be motivated by factors other than ill will. Even if ill will
motivates the defendant in part, other motivations are likely to predominate; the
77. Cf. Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41111. 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968) (buyer of corporate
stock found jointly and severally liable with a shareholder-seller of stock for aiding and abetting the
breach by that shareholder-seller of his fiduciary duties to plaintiff).
78. This difference was an alternative theory of damages alleged in Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 464 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
79. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 979 (It is sufficient for liability to show
intentional interference, which has caused harm, for an improper purpose.).
80. E.g., Gasbarro v. Lever Bros. Co., 490 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1973) (Illinois law); Phillips
Chem. Co. v. Hulbert, 301 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1962) (Texas law); Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d
24 (Alaska 1980) (to prove interference, person's conduct must be motivated by malice or ill will);
Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637 P.2d 837 (1981) (must show that motive was
personal vengeance or spite).
81. E.g., Hammerhead Enters. v. Brezenoff, 551 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (New York
law), aff'd, 707 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 237 (1983); Techno Corp. v. Dahl Assocs.,
535 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (Pennsylvania law); North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp 231 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (Pennslyvania law); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J.
Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (N.J. Ch. 1894).
82. E.g., Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (Georgia law), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1466
(11 th Cir. 1984); Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977); Heavener, Ogier Servs. v.
R.W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113
N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (N.J. 1934).
83. See Lewis, Should the Motive of the Defendant Affect the Question of His Liability?, 5
COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1905).
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predominant motive usually is considered the crucial one. 84 Few jurisdictions,
however, require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with actual

malice.

85

In those jurisdictions that require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
sought to harm the plaintiff, an action usually should be maintainable. The rival
bidder in the first situation and the target management in the second and third
situations act to defeat the plaintiff's bid. In each case, the defendants know
that harm to the putative plaintiffs is a necessary consequence of their behavior;

thus, this type of malice generally is proved easily.
The definition of malice applied most commonly by courts is that which
requires the defendant to have acted without justification or excuse. This definition of malice may require the plaintiff to negate the defendant's possible defenses. On the other hand, some jurisdictions have eliminated malice as an
element of the plaintiff's case because they view a justification or excuse as an
affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the defendant. 86 A middle ground,
however, also exists: the plaintiff could be required to negate only those justifica87
tions or excuses that the defendant alleged in its answer.

D.

Defenses and Nature of Conduct
The courts have recognized several defenses to the interference tort. In the

context of post-tender offer litigation, the most important defenses (or "privileges" or "justifications") are the following:
another's business in the
1. One is privileged to interfere with
88
course of economic competition;
2. One who is responsible for the welfare of a third person is
privileged to give honest advice to that person not to enter

into or continue business relations with another and, subject
to certain limitations, intentionally cause that person not to

perform a contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation;8 9 and

84. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982). The courts often
state that the plaintiff must prove the defendant "acted solely out of malice." Hammerhead Enters.
v. Brezenhoff, 551 F. Supp. 1360, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); cf North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. 231, 234 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (Breach of contract can give rise
to claim for intentional interference with prospective advantage if defendant's underlying motive is
.,purely malevolent, a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its own sake .....
85. Estes, supra note 42, at 343.
86. Id.
87. Cf Gasbarro v. Lever Bros., 490 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant's privilege of protecting interests of its employees was conditional and would be defeated by proof of actual malice); see
also infra note 125 (cases cited).
88. Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management, 661 P.2d 296 (Colo. Ct. App,
1982); Neel v. Allegheny County Memorial Park, 391 Pa. 354, 137 A.2d 785 (1958); Island Air, Inc.
v. LeBar, 18 Wash. App. 129, 566 P.2d 972 (1977); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768
(1965); cf. Heavener, Ogier Servs. v. R.W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (purely malicious motive may destroy the competitor's privilege).
89. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Menefee v. CBS, 458 Pa. 46, 329 A.2d 216 (1974); Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. 2d 157, 396 P.2d
148 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 770, 772 (1965).
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3. One is privileged to interfere with the expectancies of another
to protect his own contractual relations or financial
interests. 90

The relevance of these defenses in post-tender offer litigation is immediately
apparent. In the first hypothetical, the defendant bidder would argue the defense of competition. In the second and third hypotheticals, target management
might argue its right, indeed its obligation, to protect the welfare of its company
and shareholders (the second defense) and, possibly, its right to protect its own

economic interests (the third defense). The first two defenses pose difficult legal
issues. The third, however, does not-protecting one's own financial interest
should not be a defense available to the target directors. Although directors qua
directors have a financial stake in their company, the directors' duty to protect

the best interests of the shareholders must prevail over the directors' own financial interests. 91

The first two defenses are arguably more valid: after one offer, the law
should not discourage an offer by another prospective bidder or the solicitation
by target management of an offer from a so-called "white knight." If a white
knight defeats the first bid not by a higher bid, but rather by making false and

misleading statements about the first bidder in violation of the federal securities
laws, however, the white knight has acted tortiously and should be held accountable for damages. 92 Thus, when a justification for the interference exists, tor-

tious interference can be distinguished from nontortious interference only

93
through an analysis of the manner of the interfering conduct.

90. Hamro v. Shell Oil Co., 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law); Gasbarro v. Lever
Bros., 490 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1973) (Illinois law); McReynolds v. Short, 115 Ariz. 166, 564 P.2d 389
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1965).
91. Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides: "A director shall perform his
duties as a director... in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation, and with such care as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979); see Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (director may not use corporate funds to maintain himself in office); H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 625-28 (3d ed. 1983).
92. This situation occurred in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
93. Modem authority seems to require that the means of interference be wrongful even if the
defendant cannot cite a justification for the interference. E.g., A & K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green
Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977). Two recent law review articles have argued
persuasively for that conclusion. See Dobbs, TortiousInterference with ContractualRelationships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335 (1980); Pearlman, Interference with Contract and OtherEconomic Expectancies.
A Clash of Tort and ContractDoctrine, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 61 (1982). Nevertheless, by one writer's
count, proof of predatory or unlawful means is not required in a majority of jurisdictions. Estes,
supra note 42, at 349. Even in those jurisdictions that require the interfering conduct to be independently wrongful, however, the courts still must determine what kind of conduct is sufficiently objectionable to be wrongful. Must the defendant's conduct be independently tortious, or is this element
of the tort satisfied if the defendant merely acted unfairly in relation to the plaintiff. If something
less than an independent tort is sufficient, how much less will do?
The courts that have insisted on independently wrongful conduct are not uniform in what constitutes such conduct; some require proof of conduct that might be tortious aside from the interference, Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1980) (fraud,
disparagement, or intimidation), while others will accept something less, Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin, & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978) (conduct that violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979). When the defendant's conduct is
privileged (for example, by competition), the court examines the manner of interference to determine
if the privilege has been abused. Techno Corp. v. Dahl Assocs., 535 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
Presumably, a defendant's behavior may be sufficiently wrongful to allow the plaintiff to state a
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The cases have announced a variety of standards for identifying an impermissible manner of interference. At one end of the spectrum are cases such as
Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc.,94 in which the Illinois Court of Appeals vacated an order enjoining InterNorth from proceeding with a tender offer for
Crouse-Hinds, Inc. Plaintiff Belden alleged that InterNorth's offer would affect
adversely Belden's proposed merger with Crouse-Hinds and that, therefore, InterNorth was interfering with Belden's prospective advantage. In vacating the
preliminary injunction, the court of appeals stated that, "Belden cannot meet the
requirements for interference with prospective advantage unless it makes a
showing of unfair competition on the part of InterNorth. . . Unfair competition, which is not privileged, includes fraud, intimidation, or disparagement."9
The result in this case undoubtedly was correct. Belden did not act wrongfully;
it simply made a tender offer. If the language is read literally, however, the
opinion would place a significant burden of proof on a plaintiff and permit extensive nonactionable interference.
An interesting contrast to Belden, at least in terms of judicial language
defining actionable conduct, is the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Panterv. MarshallField & Co. 96 This case, like
Belden, arose out of a hostile takeover attempt; the court also looked to Illinois
law to define the interference tort. The Panter court quoted from a 1973 decision of the Illinois appellate court:
"The theory of the tort of interference, it is said, is that the law draws a
line beyond which no member of the community may go in intentionally intermeddling with the business affairs of others; that if acts of
which complaint is made do not rest on some legitimate interest, or if
there is sharp dealing or overreaching or other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly situated, the ensuing loss should be redressed; and that line of demarcation between permissible behavior
' '9 7
and interference reflects the ethical standards of the community.
Although the Pantercourt affirmed the lower court finding that defendants did
not engage in improper behavior, the standard it recognized was far different
from that in Belden. Under this commonly adopted standard, the courts act
almost as referees at a sporting event, calling "foul" when a defendant's conduct
98
exceeds some standard of fair play.
prima facie case but not too wrongful to defeat the defendant's privilege. It is difficult to articulate
and identify the type of conduct that falls between those extremes.
94. 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1980).
95. Id. at 553, 413 N.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added).
96. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
97. Id. at 298 (quoting City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Il1. App. 3d 359,
362-63, 300 N.E.2d 331, 333 (1973)).
98. Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., 384 So. 2d 303, 307
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("the ultimate inquiry is whether the interference by the defendant is
'sanctioned by the rules of the game' "); Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 226, 219
A.2d 635, 649 (N.J. Ch. 1966); cf. Techno Corp. v. Dahl Assocs., 535 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(use of confidential information by defendants is wrongful and bars them from asserting the competi.
tor's privilege); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (target unlawfully
interfered with tender offeror's banking relations by seeking to discredit offeror to its banks).
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This more flexible standard poses some interesting possibilities in posttender offer litigation. In terms of the hypotheticals posed above, the first situation would appear to include the element of wrongful interference. Violating the
federal securities laws presumably is conduct "below the behavior of fair men
similarly situated," even if the plaintiff was not in the class of persons intended
to be protected by the securities laws. In Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries99 the
Supreme Court observed that defendants' violations of certain provisions of the
Exchange Act could form the basis of a state action for interference with prospective commercial advantage, even though the violated provisions were not
enacted to protect plaintiff, a defeated tender offeror.t°°
The second and third hypotheticals raise a different question: whether behavior that is lawful under the federal securities laws nevertheless can form the
basis for a state tort action. The broad range of defensive maneuvers used by
target management has been criticized extensively. In addition to soliciting
higher bids, target boards have relied on the following defensive tactics: granting options to white knights, effectively precluding a successful tender offer by a
hostile bidder and assuring victory for the white knight (a "lock-up" defense);' 10
awarding management lucrative severance benefits in the event of a change10of2
control ("golden parachutes") to make the target less attractive to a bidder;
acquiring companies to create antitrust problems for the bidder (the "antitrust
block");10 3 and approving stock dividends that change the capital structure of
the target company and make it unattractive to the bidder (the "poison pill"
defense).10 4 In each of these and many other instances105 of aggressive defensive
maneuvers the question may be asked, "Is this conduct below the behavior of
fair men similarly situated?" If so, an additional question is raised: Is there
some policy reason that nevertheless should permit such behavior?
A strong argument can be made that these defensive maneuvers fall below
some acceptable level of behavior and, therefore, should subject the board of
directors of the target company to liability.10 6 The Panter court, however,
judged the propriety of the target board's response to a hostile tender offer by
the business judgment rule, which protects corporate directors from liability to
99. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
100. Id. at 40-41.
101. E.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
102. E.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
81 (1984).
103. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092

(1981).

104. National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (order
denying preliminary injunction); see Legal Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 2 (description of the
defense); infra note 123. For a defense of the poison pill tactic, see Note, ProtectingShareholders
Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964
(1984). The Delaware Court of Chancery recently sustained use of the poison pill defense. Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., - A.2d - (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985), noted in 17 SEc. REG. &L. REP. (BNA)

219.

105. See infra note 120. See generally SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Report of Recommendations, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Special Report, No. 1028 (July 15, 1983), at 36-46 (reviewing various defensive tactics and their policy ramifications).

106. See cases cited supra note 97.
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their shareholders for business decisions made in good faith.10 7 The Panter
court, quoting from a Delaware decision, framed the test as follows:
"[N]ot every action taken by a board of directors to thwart a tender
offer is to be condemned. The test, loosely stated, is whether the board
is fairly and reasonably exercising its business judgment to protect the
corporation and its shareholders against injury likely to befall the cor10 8
poration should the tender offer prove successful."'

A review of the case law reveals that if director action is judged by the business
judgment rule, it will not be held unlawful. 10 9 Courts generally are very reluc-

tant to second-guess business decisions made by directors.110
Thus, the real issue is whether the business judgment rule ought to be ap-

plied in these circumstances. The argument against application of the rule starts
with this well-recognized premise: if the directors are acting on a matter in
which they have a conflict of interest, the courts should scrutinize their ac-

tions.I 1i In many cases target directors are motivated at least in part by a desire
to retain their directorships and other positions with the corporation and thus
arguably have a conflict of interest.1 12 A 1980 decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, rejected such an approach,
holding that to avoid the presumptions of the business judgment rule, the plaintiff "at a minimum.

. .

must make a showing that the sole orprimarymotive of

the defendant [director] was to retain control."'' 13 With the sophisticated advice
that target management receives in contested takeover battles, only in rare cases
4
can such a showing be made."t
107. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); see W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 537-53 (5th ed. 1980), and sources cited therein.
108. 646 F.2d at 294 (quoting GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155, slip. op. at 3
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1980)).
109. For a review of several recent decisions, see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'sBoard.
room; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981).
110. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 301 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980);
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Auerbach v. Bennett, 42 N.Y.2d 619, 63031, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979). See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 661-63 (describing the "business judgment" rule).
111. Under modem authority, if the directors authorize a transaction in which they have a personal interest, the transaction is voidable by the corporation unless the directors prove that the
transaction was fair to the corporation. Thus, the presence of a conflicting interest removes the
favorable presumption of the business judgment rule and shifts the burden of sustaining the transaction to the directors. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 637-44.
112. Panter, 646 F.2d at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F.
Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981) ("in the context of a tender offer, the directors have an inherent
conflict of interest"); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich, Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. III.
1969).
113. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir.) (emphasis added), vacated on other
grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
114. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'sBoardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 120-31 (1979), in
which the author sets forth detailed advice for directors to defeat a hostile tender offer and preserve
their business judgment defense. See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977); 1 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (2d ed. 1983). But see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (showing of board's self-interest made when stock transferred
to subsidiary and to stock option plan was to be approved by vote of board of parent, members of
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Several commentators' 1 5 and some judges1 16 have criticized the current application of the business judgment rule in takeover contests; some even have
1 17
suggested that the proper response of target management is no response.
Such criticism has prompted recent proposals to amend the Exchange Act to

limit certain defensive maneuvers available to target management.118 The proposed legislation, however, does not address all the abuses, nor can it anticipate

new tactics that may be devised. Unless the rule is abandoned or limited in some
way in suits involving tender offers, disgruntled shareholders bringing a tort action in the third hypothetical would not succeed. This result, however, is unjust;
although target management should be free to seek a better offer or persuade the
shareholders not to accept the offer, the benefits of any further interference by
management do not outweigh the losses that the shareholders would incur.
In the first two hypotheticals, the plaintiff is a third party, rather than a
shareholder, and target management presumably is fighting a tender offer that it
believes, in good faith, not to be in the best interest of the company. Some
writers'1 9 and several courts1 20 have stated that, in this situation, there should
be no limits on directors' actions, and therefore any type of interference is justi-

fied. Once a good faith determination has been made to "fight" a hostile tender
offer, the target directors, under this view, must be given a free hand to employ

any defensive maneuver not forbidden by law. 12 1 This response, however, ignores the traditional purpose of the rule-to protect directors from suits by disboard of parent were appointed trustees of stock option plan, and stock option plan created same day
stock was issued).
115.

M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 235-39 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel,

The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161
(1981); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
621 (1983); J. Huber, Remarks to the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law (Apr. 7, 1984) (summarized in 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 639-40
(Apr. 13, 1984)).
116. Panter,646 F.2d at 299-304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
299-301 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), vacatedon other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
117. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 114, at 1194-1204.
118. H.R. 5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). This bill, introduced by Rep. Tim Wirth, would
require target management to prove that its defensive maneuvers were prudent to the issuer, fair to
shareholders, and satisfied the business judgment rule. 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 21, at
913 (May 25, 1984); see also H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (would impose additional restraints on corporate takeover process, including revisions affecting tender offers, proxy solicitations,
and securities acquisitions); S. 2782, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (includes provisions to restrict
securities purchases and executive compensation arrangements in corporate takeover situations).
119. E.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender
Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980); Lipton, supra note 113; Steinbrink, Management's Response to
the Takeover Attempt, 28 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 882 (1978); Fleischer, Business Judgment Rule
Protects Takeover Targets, Legal Times, Apr. 14, 1980, at 15.
120. In addition to Panter, see Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
121. E.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (I.D. Ill. 1969)
("[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimental
to the company or its stockholders. . . . After [making a carefully considered decision] the company may then take any step not forbidden by law to counter the attempted capture."); Lipton, supra
note 113, at 123 (After a proper board determination that a takeover should be rejected, directors
may resist with any "reasonable actions," which include "litigation, complaints to government authorities, the acquisition of a company to create an antitrust or regulatory problem for the raider, the
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appointed shareholders.12 2 Moreover, it ignores the legitimate interest of the
bidder, who is protected by the interference tort, in being able to compete fairly
to acquire the target company.
The defensive maneuvers allowed a target company should be limited' 23 on
a case-by-case basis. Target management should be privileged 124 to interfere
issuance of shares to a big brother, or the premium purchase of shares of the target from the
raider.").
122. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. Ch. 1980) (The business judgment rule
"provides a shield with which directors may oppose stockholders' attacks on the decisions made by
them."), rev'd on other grounds, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule
Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
123. But cf Great W. Prod. Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873
(1980). In this case plaintiff agreed to sell substantially all of its assets, which consisted of the stock
of a wholly-owned subsidiary, to defendant. Shareholder approval was required, and plaintiff's directors agreed to use their "best efforts" to secure it. Due to price movements in the commodities
markets after the sale agreement was executed, the value of the subsidiary increased significantly.
The directors of plaintiff withdrew their recommendation of approval and the transaction was not
approved. Plaintiff brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the purchase agreement had
been terminated; defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. On the counterclaim, the court held that the "best efforts" clause did not bind the directors to recommend approval
when they determined "pursuant to the exercise of their independent good faith judgment, that the
terms of the purchase agreement were no longer in the security holders' best interests." Id. at 187,
613 P.2d at 879.
Arguably, Great Western protects target directors seeking to defeat a tender offer that they
believe is not in the best interests of the target shareholders. Just as a director's fiduciary duty
protects him from a breach of contract action, so might fiduciary duty limit tort liability. Great
Western, however, is not that broad. In effect, all the court held is that the contract included an
implied term that the directors need not seek approval if doing so would violate their fiduciary
duties. It does not follow thereby that directors can engage in tortious or illegal conduct in discharging their fiduciary duties.
In Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984), plaintiff Jewel had
signed a merger agreement with Pay Less Drug Stores, the target company. Before the shareholder
vote ratifying the agreement, defendant Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest made a competing tender
offer. Although the initial agreement required the target directors to use "best efforts" to consummate the merger, they withdrew their support from it and entered into a new agreement with defendant.
The court held that it was possible for a board of directors to enter into a valid contract that
required the board's support of the agreement, and remanded to determine the intent of the parties.
It also rejected a lower court's holding that "a merger contract is justified as a matter of law because
'the marketplace is the proper forum to resolve competing tender offers.'" Id. at 1567 (quoting
Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., 550 F. Supp. 770, 773 (N.D. Cal. 1982)), The court
stated:
It is nowhere written in stone that the law of the jungle must be the exclusive doctrine
governing sorties into the world of corporate mergers. The legitimate exercise of the right
to contract by responsible boards of directors can help bring some degree of much needed
order to these transactions.
Id. at 1568-69.
124. No privilege is absolute. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586
F.2d 530, 551-52 (5th Cir. 1978), (privilege of protecting the public welfare lost if defendant used
threats), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Gasbarro v. Lever Bros., 490 F.2d 424, 426 (7th Cir.
1973) (defendant's statements were conditionally privileged, so plaintiff must prove actual malice to
sustain cause of action); International Adm'rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 541 F. Supp. 1080,
1082-83 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant sought to compete through
intimidation, force, coercion, threats, and misrepresentations, and thus the complaint for interference with prospective business advantage was sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss); Williams v.
Burns, 540 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (D. Colo. 1982) (summary judgment would not be awarded to
defendant on the claim of interference with prospective business relations because defendant's privi.
lege, to protect the interest of third parties, may be defeated if plaintiff proves that defendant acted
with malice); Techno Corp. v. Dahl Assocs., 535 F. Supp. 303, 307 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (defendants'
means of interference and motive defeated privilege of competition); Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash.
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with an offer in a reasonable manner, such as soliciting other offers and urging
shareholders not to tender to a hostile bidder. The ingenuity of tender offer

counsel constrained only by a disclosure statute, however, is limitless, as was
demonstrated by Martin Marietta's surprising "pac-man" defense'

25

that de-

12 6
feated Bendix's tender offer in 1982 and the novel "poison-pill" defense

adopted by Lennox to thwart Brown-Forman's bid in 1983. Such responses,
which preclude a bidder's success,12 7 should be viewed as unprivileged or an
abuse of privilege. Focusing on the nature of the interference in this situation is

entirely appropriate and consistent with judicial analysis in other interference
cases. 128
The traditional formulation of the interference tort thus affords a basis for

an aggrieved tender offeror, and possibly a shareholder of the target corporation,
to recover damages resulting from unlawful interference with the offer. The
2d 157, 166, 396 P.2d 148, 153-54 (1964) (malice destroys privilege). But see Stidham v. State Dep't
of Licensing, 30 Wash. App. 611, 615-16, 637 P.2d 970, 973 (1981) (remarks of governmental official

absolutely privileged against claim of interference with prospective economic advantage).
125. In a "pac-man" defense, the target company makes a tender offer for the shares of the

bidder. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982), in which the
court described the defense.
Closely analogous to the pac-man defense is the "scorched earth" defense, in which the target
company proposes a transaction that makes it an unattractive merger partner for the bidder. In
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982), for instance, the target agreed to sell its
principal subsidiary to a third party. The bidder's attempt to enjoin the transaction was unsuccessful.
Another illustration of the scorched earth defense (at least an allegation of one) occurred when
Saul Steinberg attempted a takeover of Walt Disney Productions. Mr. Steinberg has alleged that he
dropped plans to make a tender offer when he learned that Disney planned to make a cash offer, at a
high price, for shares that Mr. Steinberg did not purchase. The result of Disney's actions, if carried
out, would have been to leave Mr. Steinberg the sole owner of a company heavily in debt. Wall St.
J., July 5, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
126. The "poison-pill" defense has been described as follows:
[A] corporation distributes to its common stockholders a dividend in the form of a convertible preferred stock. The preferred stock is convertible into at least the same number of
outstanding common shares, so roughly half of the outstanding equity is represented by the
convertible preferred. The plan provides that dividends on common shares will be reduced
by 50 percent, but that dividends on the preferred stock will be slightly more than 50
percent of the dividends received before issuance of the preferred.
Once a raider acquires more than a certain percentage of a company's voting power
...and does not promptly propose and consummate a merger, the preferred becomes
redeemable for cash at any time at a price equal to the highest price paid by the raider
during the previous 12 months. This provision is intended to prevent a partial offer that is
not followed by a second step, which could adversely affect stock value.
The preferred stock contains a "flipover" provision in the event of a tender offer followed by a merger. That provision allows holders to exchange their preferred stock for
voting preferred stock in the acquiror. The target's shareholders could convert those
shares into common stock, which could lead to unpredictable dilution of pershare earnings.
Legal Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at 9, col 2.
Companies sometimes issue "poison pill" shares in anticipation of an offer or when the directors
feel the company is vulnerable to a takeover. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, for instance, recently
distributed rights to its common stockholders that entitled the holder to purchase common shares of
the surviving company with a market value equal to twice the exercise price of the right. The right is
exercisable when someone acquires 20% of the company's common or makes an offer for 30% or
more of the stock. Wall St. J., July 20, 1984, at 33, col 1.
127. See supra notes 124-25.
128. See cases cited supra note 123.
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other formulations of the tort, the Restatement Second and the Oregon approach, similarly should allow these actions.
III.

THE APPROACH OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth a three-part definition of the
tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage. Section 766B of the
Restatement is the cornerstone of this definition:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the
benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the pro1 29
spective relation.

The finesse of section 766B lies in the interpretation of the word "improperly."
This word, the drafters tell us, is a substitute for "culpable and not justifiable"
conduct 130 that, for various reasons, they found objectionable.13 1
Section 767 then sets forth seven factors to consider in determining whether
an actor's conduct is improper. These factors are:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.1 32
Finally, in sections 768 through 774 the drafters apply the general rules of
sections 766B and 767 to conduct that formerly was discussed under the rubric
of "privilege." For example, section 768 discusses the circumstances under
which interference motivated by competitive considerations is not "improper."
The Restatement, however, does not use the terms "privilege" or "defense." Instead, it refers to the unified approach of section 766B: Is the interference, considering all the circumstances, improper?
In comment k to Section 767 the drafters discuss burdens of proof. After
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1965).
130. Id., Introductory Note to Ch. 37.
131. Id. The drafters explained that the use of a single new term would emphasize the balancing
process inherent in the interference tort. In addition, the terms "culpable and not justifiable" had
connotations from other torts that the drafters found undesirable.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1965).
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noting that there is no consensus on who has to prove justification or lack of it,
they suggest that when the matter goes to the culpability of the defendant, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Thus, if the issue is whether the defendant
was competing with the plaintiff for the business of a third person, the plaintiff
should bear the burdens of pleading and proof. On the other hand, when the
relationship between the defendant and a third party arguably gives the defendant special license to interfere, the burden of proving justification would be on
33
the defendant.'
Although the Restatement approach seeks to bring some order to this area,
it is not easy to understand or apply. The courts that have cited it often have
avoided its prescribed analysis.1 34 The most difficult question in this area of the
law-whether the nature of the defendant's conduct must be independently
wrongful for the interference to be unlawful-remains unanswered by the Restatement. Instead, the nature of the defendant's conduct becomes just one of
several factors that the courts are to assess in determining whether the interfer-

ence is improper. If the interference is accomplished by actual physical violence
or threats of violence, or fraudulent misrepresentation, the interference usually
would be improper. 135 On the other hand, if the defendant's sole motive was to
injure the plaintiff,136 such interference would be improper, whether the means
used were innocent or not. As the introductory note to this chapter of the Restatement indicates, this area of the law has not congealed and may not be appropriate for a restatement. 137 The authors of the Restatement have made a
valuable contribution, however, by noting that simple rules regarding the de-

fendant's motive and the nature of the defendant's conduct cannot be formalized. Rather, motive and conduct are just two of many factors that the fact

finder must consider.
Nothing in the Restatement approach necessarily would change any of the
133. This distinction is not satisfactory. The defendant's culpability is as much at issue when he
is a competitor as when he is in a special relationship. The distinction, if one exists, may be that in
the latter case the facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge and it would be unfair to
expect the plaintiff to anticipate and disprove this defense. Competition, however, is a generally
available defense; the plaintiff should know whether the defendant is his competitor and, if so, plaintiff should be prepared to raise the defense and demonstrate why it is unavailable under the circumstances. This analysis suggests that the burden of proof be allocated on the basis of fairness or
reasonableness, not a wholly unworkable standard, but one with certain difficulties. In any event,
the drafters' decision not to propose a rule on burden of proof reflects the disagreements among the
courts and the difficulty of formalizing this area of the law.
134. Two prominent examples are Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201,
582 P.2d 1365 (1978), and Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), in
which the courts, in well-reasoned opinions, reexamined the law in their respective jurisdictions,
considered the approach of the Restatement, and chose a different formulation. Other courts have
used selected portions of the Restatement. See, e.g., M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 94
N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1980). The federal courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, have
been more willing than the states to embrace the Restatement. See Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v.
Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 1980); Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Franklin Music Co. v. ABC, 616 F.2d 528 (3d Cir.
1979). But see United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982) (Minnesota relied
on Restatement).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 comment c (1965).
136. Id. comment d.
137. See supra note 128.
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previously discussed results of the hypotheticals. In the first hypothetical, the
defendant would seek to justify its conduct under section 768 with the "defense"
of competition. That section, however, indicates that an actor improperly interferes if he employs "wrongful means" in the course of competition. 13 8 A defendant's violation of the federal securities laws in that situation presumably
would be considered wrongful means. The directors' justifications in the second
and third hypotheticals, which are set forth in section 770 of the Restatement,
also are lost if wrongful means are employed. 139 The abusive defensive maneuvers that target management frequently uses certainly could be considered
wrongful under this approach.
At about the time the drafters of the Restatement were attempting to clarify
the law in this area, a few state courts were making similar efforts. The Supreme
Court of Oregon has demonstrated a degree of independence in this area, particularly in its leading decision of Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 140
IV. THE OREGON APPROACH
In Top Service, plaintiff, an automobile repair shop, alleged that defendant
insurance company unlawfully interfered with its business by directing insurance claimants to have repairs done at competing body shops. At trial, the jury
entered verdicts in favor of plaintiff, but these verdicts were set aside by the trial
court, primarily for lack of proof.141 On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court opinion1 42 and, in doing so, reviewed and summarized
the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage:
In summary, such a claim [for intentional interference with contractual or other economic relations] is made out when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact
of the interference itself. Defendant's liability may arise from improper motives or from the use of improper means. They may be
wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized
rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or
profession. No question of privilege arises unless the interference
would be wrongful but for the privilege; it becomes an issue only if the
acts charged would be tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant. Even a recognized privilege may be overcome when the means
used by defendant are not justified by the reason for recognizing the
privilege. 143
To a certain extent, the court follows the approach of the Restatement, 1 " but
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 768 (1965).

139. Id. § 770.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978).
Id. at 203, 582 P.2d at 1367.
Id. at 223, 582 P.2d at 1378.
Id. at 209-10, 582 P.2d at 1371.
Id. at 210, 582 P.2d at 1371.
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avoids the cumbersome balancing tests of the Restatement's section 767.145 The
court intimates that privilege (a matter covered in sections 768 to '774 of the
Restatement) is an issue that arises only if the plaintiff establishes a "wrongful"
1 46
interference.
The Oregon Supreme Court did not address who bears the burden of proof
on privilege, however, until confronted with another case the following year. In
Straube v. Larson147 the court affirmed its Top Service analysis and added, with
regard to defendant's claim of privilege, the following explanation: "The rule we
have applied, which denies an action for interference when made in good faith
for a proper purpose, amounts to the application of a qualified privilege, with the
burden of negating this qualifiedprivilege placed upon plaintiffas part of his affirmative case."148 Despite this language, it is unclear whether the plaintiff must
negate in his pleadings and initial presentation of evidence possible privileges or
whether his burden arises only after the defendant has come forward with some
proof of privilege. It is more logical to require the defendant to raise the defense
of privilege so as not to place too great a burden on the plaintiff. Thus, if the
plaintiff established an improper interference based on the defendant's ill will
and the defendant proved that the parties were competitors, the burden then
would shift back to the plaintiff either to disprove the defendant's claim of competition, to demonstrate that the defendant was motivated predominantly by ill
will, or to show that the privilege was abused. This approach is consistent with
the Oregon court's broad definition of the tort quoted above 14 9 and with the
approach of the Utah and New Mexico supreme courts, which interpreted Top
Service to hold that the claim of privilege is an affirmative defense.1 50
The Oregon approach is sufficiently flexible to permit recovery in some
post-tender offer litigation. The defendant, in each hypothetical, arguably employed "improper means" of interference. The next issue then is whether the
plaintiff can overcome the asserted privilege; this inquiry does not differ from
those discussed above.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage can be a useful tool in tender offer litigation. In one reported case, the court refused to dismiss a claim for an injunction based on this tort.1 5 1 Although no reported cases
have awarded damages to tender offer participants on this theory, an action
should be maintainable. As litigation in this area develops, two principal obstacles to recovery may be a broad interpretation of the defense of competition for
defendant rival bidders and a pervasive use of the business judgment rule in
145. Id. at 210 n.12, 582 P.2d at 1371 n.12.
146. Id. at 210, 582 P.2d at 1371.
147. 287 Or. 357, 600 P.2d 371 (1979).
148. Id. at 371, 600 P.2d at 379 (emphasis added).
149. See supra text accompanying note 140.
150. See M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 94 N.M. 449, 455, 612 P.2d 241, 247 (Ct.
App. 1980); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).
151. Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

518

NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

judging defendant target managements. Although these defenses are legitimate,
they also have their limitations. A third obstacle to recovery may be an inability
to calculate damages. In many cases, however, damages or other relief will be
capable of calculation and clearly appropriate.

